A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer by Cheng, Yu et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
05
20
7v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  8
 O
ct 
20
18
A Simple Mechanism
for a Budget-Constrained Buyer
Yu Cheng1, Nick Gravin2, Kamesh Munagala1, and Kangning Wang1
1 Duke University; {yucheng,kamesh,knwang}@cs.duke.edu
2 Shanghai University of Finance and Economics; nikolai@mail.shufe.edu.cn
Abstract. We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of
monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In
this setting a monopolist seller with m heterogeneous items faces a single
buyer and seeks to maximize her revenue. The buyer has a budget and ad-
ditive valuations drawn independently for each item from (non-identical)
distributions. We show that when the buyer’s budget is publicly known,
the better of selling each item separately and selling the grand bundle
extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. When the budget is
private, we consider a standard Bayesian setting where buyer’s budget
b is drawn from a known distribution B. We show that if b is indepen-
dent of the valuations and distribution B satisfies monotone hazard rate
condition, then selling items separately or in a grand bundle is still ap-
proximately optimal. We give a complementary example showing that
no constant approximation simple mechanism is possible if budget b can
be interdependent with valuations.
1 Introduction
Revenue maximization is one of the fundamental problems in auction theory.
The well-celebrated result of Myerson [43] characterized the revenue-maximizing
mechanism when there is only one item for sale. Specifically, in the single buyer
case, the optimal solution is to post a take-it-or-leave-it price. Since Myerson’s
work, the optimal mechanism design problem has been studied extensively in
computer science literature and much progress has been made [12, 13, 14, 15, 2,
26]. The problem of finding the optimal auction turned out to be so much more
complex than the single-item case. Unlike the Myerson’s single-item auction, the
optimum can use randomized allocations and price bundles of items already for
two items and a single buyer. It is also known that the gap between the revenue of
the optimal randomized and optimal deterministic mechanism can be arbitrarily
large [11, 38], the optimal mechanism may require a menu with infinitely many
options [42, 27], and the revenue of the optimal auction may decrease when
the buyer’s valuation distributions move upwards (in the stochastic dominance
sense).
In light of these negative results for optimal auction design, many recent
papers focused on the design of simple mechanisms that are approximately op-
timal. One such notable line of work initiated by Hart and Nisan [39] concerns
2a basic and natural setting of monopoly problem for the buyer with item values
drawn independently from given distributions D1, . . . , Dm and whose valuation
for the sets of items is additive3 (linear). A remarkable result by Babaioff et al. [4]
showed that the better mechanism of either selling items separately, or selling
the grand bundle extracts at least (1/6)-fraction of the optimal revenue. It was
also observed [38, 4, 45] that the independence assumption on the items is essen-
tially necessary and without it no simple (any deterministic) mechanism cannot
be approximately optimal.
Auction design with budget constraints is an even harder problem. Because
buyer’s utility is no longer quasi-linear, many standard concepts do not carry
over4. For example, even for one buyer and one item, the optimal mechanism
may require randomization when the budget is public [21], and may need an
exponential-size menu when the budget is private [30]. Despite many efforts [40,
23, 35, 10, 1, 24, 31, 9, 8, 18, 21, 7, 34, 29, 28, 30, 46], the theory of optimal
auction design with budgets is still far behind the theory without budgets.
In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of simple mechanisms in the
presence of budgets. Our work is motivated by the following questions:
How powerful are simple mechanisms in the presence of budgets? In par-
ticular, is there a simple mechanism that is approximately optimal for a
budget-constrained buyer with independent valuations?
To this end we consider one of the most basic and natural settings of exten-
sively studied monopoly problem for an additive buyer. In this setting, a monop-
olistic seller sells m items to a single buyer. The buyer has additive valuations
drawn independently for each item from an arbitrary (non-identical) distribu-
tion. We study two different budget settings: the public budget case where the
buyer has a fixed budget known to the seller, and the private budget case where
the buyer’s budget is drawn from a distribution. The seller wishes to maximize
her revenue by designing an auction subject to individual rationality, incentive
compatibility, and budget constraints. We consider the Bayesian setting where
the buyer knows his budget and his values for each item, but the seller only
knows the prior distributions.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
Our first result is that simple mechanisms remain approximately optimal when
the buyer has a public budget.
Theorem 1. For an additive buyer with a known public budget and independent
valuations, the better of selling each item separately and selling the grand bundle
extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.
3 A buyer has additive valuations if his value for a set of items is equal to the sum of
his values for the items in the set.
4 E.g., the classic VCG mechanism may not be implementable and social efficiency
may not be achievable in the budgeted-setting [46].
3Theorem 1 is among the few positive results in budget-constrained settings that
hold for arbitrary distributions. Before our work, it is not clear that any mech-
anism extracting a constant fraction of the optimal revenue can be computed in
polynomial time.
In Sections 3 and 4, we present two different approaches to prove Theorem 1.
Both approaches truncate the valuation distribution V according to the budget
b (in different ways) and then relate the revenues of the optimal/simple mecha-
nisms on the truncated distribution to the revenues on the original valuations.
The first approach uses the main result of [4] in a black-box way, and the second
approach adapts the duality-based framework developed in [16].
It is worth pointing out that many of our structural lemmas hold for cor-
related valuations as well. Using these lemmas, we can generalize Theorem 1
with minimum effort to allow the buyer to have weakly correlated valuations.
We call a distribution V̂ weakly correlated if it is the result of conditioning an
independent distribution V on the sum of v ∼ V being at most c: V̂ = V|(
∑
vi≤c)
(See Definition 4 for the formal definition).
Corollary 2. Let V̂ be a weakly correlated distribution. For an additive buyer
with a public budget and valuations drawn from V̂ , the better of selling separately
and selling the grand bundle extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.
In Section 5, we examine the private budget setting. The budget b is no
longer fixed but is drawn from a distribution B. The seller only knows the
prior distribution B but not the value of b. We first show that if the valuations
can be correlated with the budget, the problem is at least as hard as budget-
free mechanism design with correlated valuations, where simple mechanisms are
known to be ineffective. In light of this negative result, we focus on the setting
where the budget distribution B is independent of the valuations V . In this
setting, we show that simple mechanisms are approximately optimal when the
budget distribution satisfies the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition.
Theorem 3. When the budget distribution B is MHR, the better mechanism of
pricing items separately and selling a grand bundle achieves a constant fraction
of the optimal revenue.
We will show that it is sufficient to pretend the buyer has a public budget
b∗ = Eb∼B [b]. The proof of Theorem 3 uses the MHR condition, as well as
the fact that for a public budget b, the (budget-constrained) optimal revenue is
nondecreasing in b, but optimal revenue divided by b is nonincreasing in b.
1.2 Related Work
The most closely related to ours are the following two lines of work.
Simple Mechanisms. In a line of work initiated by Hart and Nisan [39, 41, 4],
[4] first showed that for an additive buyer with independent valuations, either
selling separately or selling the grand bundle extracts a constant fraction of
4the optimal revenue. This was later extended to multiple buyers [49], as well
as buyers with more general valuations (e.g., sub-additive [45], valuations with
a common-value component [6], and valuations with complements [33]). Others
have studied the trade-off between the complexity and approximation ratio of an
auction, along with the design of small-menu mechanisms in various settings [38,
48, 32, 25, 3].
Auctions for Budget-Constrained Buyers. There has been a lot of work
studying the impact of budget constraints on mechanism design. Most of the
earlier work required additional assumptions on the valuations distributions, like
regularity or monotone hazard rate ([40, 23, 9, 44]). We mention a few results that
work for arbitrary distributions. For public budgets, [21] designed approximately
optimal mechanisms for several single-parameter settings and multi-parameter
settings with unit-demand buyers. For private budgets, [30] characterized the
structure of the optimal mechanism for one item and one buyer. [28] gave a
constant-factor approximation for additive bidders whose private budgets can
be correlated with their values. However, they require the buyers’ valuation
distribution to be given explicitly, which is of exponential size in our setting.
There are also approximation and hardness results in the prior-free setting [10,
1, 29], as well as designing Pareto optimal auctions [31, 34].
Other Related Work. Our work concerns revenue maximization for additive
buyer. Another natural and basic scenario extensively studied in the literature
concerns buyers with unit-demand preferences [19, 20, 22]. Our work studies
monopoly problem for additive budgeted buyer in the standard Bayesian ap-
proach. In this framework, the prior distribution is known to the seller and
typically is assumed to be independent. Parallel to this framework, the (bud-
geted) additive monopoly problem has been studied in a new robust optimiza-
tion framework [17, 36]. Another group of papers on budget feasible mechanism
design [7, 24, 47, 46] studies different reverse auction settings and are concerned
with value maximization.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Optimal Mechanism Design
We study the design of optimal auctions with one buyer, one seller, and m
heterogeneous items labeled by [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. There is exactly one copy
of each item, and the items are indivisible. The buyer has additive valuation
(v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({i}) for any set S ⊆ [m]) and a publicly known budget b
5.
We use v ∈ Rm to denote the buyer’s valuations, where vj is the buyer’s value
for item j. We consider the Bayesian setting of the problem, in which the buyer’s
values are drawn from a discrete6 distribution V . Let T = supp(V ) be the set
5 In this paper, we mostly focus on the public budget case. So we define notations
and discuss backgrounds assuming the buyer has a public budget.
6 Like previous work on simple and approximately optimal mechanisms, our results
extend to continuous types as well (see, e.g., [16] for a more detailed discussion).
5of all possible valuation profiles in V . We use f(t) for any t ∈ T to denote the
probability mass function of V : f(t) = Prv∼V [v = t]. Let Tj = supp(Vj). We say
the valuation distribution V is independent across items if it can be expressed
as V = ×jVj .
We assume the buyer is risk-neutral and has quasi-linear utility when the
payment does not exceed his budget. Let π : T → [0, 1]m and p : T → R denote
the allocation and payment rules of a mechanism respectively. That is, when the
buyer reports type t, the probability that he will receive item j is πj(t), and his
expected payment is p(t) (over the randomness of the mechanism). Thus, if the
buyer has type t, his (expected) value for reporting type t′ is exactly π(t′)⊤t, 7
and his (expected) utility for reporting type t′ is
u(t, t′) =
{
π(t′)⊤t− p(t′) if p(t′) ≤ b, and
−∞ otherwise.
By the revelation principle, it is sufficient to consider mechanisms that are
incentive compatible (i.e., “truthful”). A mechanism M = (π, p) is (interim)
incentive-compatible (IC) if the buyer is incentivized to tell the truth (over
the randomness of mechanism), and (interim) individually rational (IR) if the
buyer’s expected utility is non-negative whenever he reports truthfully. We use
∅ for the option of not participating in the auction (π(∅) = 0, p(∅) = 0), and
let T+ = T ∪ {∅}. Then, the IC and IR constraints can be unified as follows:
u(t, t) ≥ u(t, t′) ∀t ∈ T, t′ ∈ T+.
To summarize, when the seller faces a single buyer with budget b and valuation
drawn from V , the optimal mechanism M∗ = (π∗, p∗) is the optimal solution to
the following (exponential-size) linear program (LP):
maximize
∑
t∈T f(t)p(t)
subject to π(t′)⊤t− p(t′) ≤ π(t)⊤t− p(t), ∀t ∈ T, t′ ∈ T+.
0 ≤ πj(t) ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ T, j ∈ [m].
p(t) ≤ b, ∀t ∈ T.
π(∅) = 0, p(∅) = 0.
(1)
A mechanism is called ex-post IC, ex-post IR, or ex-post budget-preserving
respectively, if the corresponding constraints hold for all possible outcomes, with-
out averaging over the randomness in the mechanism. We will show the better
of pricing each item separately and pricing the grand bundle, which is a deter-
ministic ex-post mechanism, can extract a constant fraction of the revenue of
any interim mechanism.
2.2 Simple Mechanisms
For a buyer with valuation distribution V , we frequently use the following nota-
tions in our analysis:
7 We use x⊤y =
∑
m
i=1 xiyi to denote the inner product of two vectors x and y.
6– Rev(V ): the revenue of the optimal truthful mechanism.
– SRev(V ): the maximum revenue obtainable by pricing each item separately.
– BRev(V ): the maximum revenue obtainable by pricing the grand bundle.
– Revb(V ): the revenue of the optimal truthful mechanism, when the buyer
has a budget b.
– SRevb(V ): the maximum revenue that can be extracted by pricing each item
separately, when the buyer has a public budget b.
– BRevb(V ): the maximum revenue that can be extracted by pricing the grand
bundle, when the buyer has a public budget b.
We know that SRev(V ) is obtained by running Myerson’s optimal auction sep-
arately for each item, and BRev(V ) is obtained by running Myerson’s auction
viewing the grand bundle as one item. Similarly, BRevb(V ) is a single-parameter
problem as well, with the minor change that the posted price is at most b.
The case of SRevb(V ) is more complicated. For example, when a budgeted
buyer of type t ∈ Rm participates in an auction with posted price pj for each item
j, he will maximize his utility by solving a Knapsack problem. There exists a
poly-time computable mechanism that extracts a constant fraction of SRevb(V )
(e.g., [8]). We focus on the structural result that the better of SRevb(V ) and
BRevb(V ) is a constant approximation of Revb(V ). A better approximation for
SRevb(V ) is an interesting open problem that is beyond the scope of this paper.
2.3 Weakly Correlated Distributions
We call a distribution like V̂ weakly correlated if the only condition causing the
correlation is a cap on its sum.
Definition 4. For an m-dimensional independent distribution V and a thresh-
old c > 0, we remove the probability mass on any t ∈ supp(V ) with ‖t‖1 > c and
renormalize. Let V̂ := V|(‖v‖
1
≤c) denote the resulting distribution. Formally,
Pr
v̂∼V̂
[v̂ = t] = Pr
v∼V
[v = t | ‖v‖1 ≤ c], ∀t ∈ supp(V ).
Weakly correlated distributions arise naturally in our analysis. We will show
that if the buyer’s valuations are weakly correlated, then the better of selling
separately and selling the grand bundle is approximately optimal, and this holds
with or without a (public) budget constraint.
2.4 First-Order Stochastic Dominance
Stochastic dominance is a partial order between random variables. A random
variable X with supp(X) ⊆ R (weakly) first-order stochastically dominates an-
other random variable Y with supp(Y ) ⊆ R if and only if
Pr[X ≥ a] ≥ Pr[Y ≥ a] for all a ∈ R.
This notion of stochastic dominance can be extended to multi-dimensional
distributions. In this paper, we use the notion of coordinate-wise dominance.
7Definition 5. Given two m-dimensional distributions D1 and D2, we say D1
coordinate-wise stochastic dominates D2 (D1  D2 or D2  D1) if there exists
a randomized mapping f : supp(D1) → supp(D2) such that f(x) ∼ D2 when
x ∼ D1, and f(x) ≤ x coordinate-wise for all x ∈ supp(D1) with probability 1.
This notion helps us express the monotonicity of optimal revenues in some cases.
For example, we can show that SRev(V1) ≥ SRev(V2) when V1  V2. The
mapping f allows us to couple the draws v1 ∼ V1 and v2 ∼ V2, so that for a set
of fixed prices, if the buyer buys an item under v2, he will also buy it under v1.
3 Public Budget
In this section, we focus on the public budget case and prove our main result
(Theorem 1). The buyer has a fixed budget b and valuations drawn from an
independent distribution V .
Theorem 1. Revb(V ) ≤ 8SRevb(V ) + 24BRevb(V ).
It follows that the better of SRevb(V ) and BRevb(V ) is at least Rev
b(V )
32 .
8
Overview of Our Approach. Instead of taking the Lagrangian dual of LP (1)
to derive an upper bound on the optimal objective value Revb(V ), we adopt a
more combinatorial approach. Intuitively, we come up with a charging argument
that splits Revb(V ) and charges each part to either SRevb(V ) or BRevb(V ).
First, we partition the buyer types t ∈ supp(V ) into two sets: high-value
types where ‖t‖∞ ≥ b and low-value types where ‖t‖∞ < b. Note that we can
already charge the revenue of high-value types to BRevb(V ): If we sell the grand
bundle at price b, all high-value types will exhaust their budgets.
We now examine the low-value types. Let V ′ denote the valuation distribution
conditioned on the buyer having a low-value type. Observe that V ′ is independent
because it is defined using ℓ∞-norm, and we can remove the budget to upper
bound its revenue. For a budget-free additive buyer with independent valuations,
we can apply the main result of [4], which states that either selling separately
or grand bundling works for V ′: Rev(V ′) = O(SRev(V ′) +BRev(V ′)).
Next, we will relate SRev(V ′),BRev(V ′) to SRevb(V ′),BRevb(V ′). We
can assume the sum of v′ ∼ V ′ is usually much smaller than b. Similar to
standard tail bounds, if the sum ‖v′‖1 is often small and the random variables
are independent and bounded (each v′j is at most b), then ‖v
′‖1 must have an
exponentially decaying tail. Therefore, we can add back the budget, because the
sum ‖v′‖1, which upper bounds the buyer’s payment, is rarely very large.
Finally, we will show that SRevb(V ′) = O(SRevb(V )) and BRevb(V ′) ≤
BRevb(V ). The BRev statement is easy to verify, but the SRev statement
8 We do not optimize the constants in our proofs. In Section 4, we will give an alter-
native proof of Theorem 1 that shows Revb(V ) ≤ 5SRevb(V ) + 6BRevb(V ), thus
improving this constant from 32 to 11.
8is more tricky. The monotonicity of SRev(V ) in the budget-free case (see Sec-
tion 2.4) no longer holds when there is a budget. Fortunately, we can pay a factor
of two and circumvent this non-monotonicity due to budget constraints.
We will now make our intuitions formal and present three key lemmas.
Throughout the paper, we will always use V ′ = V|‖v‖
∞
≤b as defined below.
Definition 6. Fix an m-dimensional distribution V = ×Vj. Let V
′ be the in-
dependent distribution where every coordinate of V is capped at b. That is,
V ′ = ×jV
′
j , and V
′
j is given by PrV ′j [x] = Prvj∼Vj [min(vj , b) = x].
Lemma 7. Revb(V ) ≤ Rev(V ′) +BRevb(V ).
Lemma 8. Assume BRevb(V ′) < b10 . Then, BRev(V
′) ≤ 3BRevb(V ′) and
SRev(V ′) ≤ SRevb(V ′) + 4BRevb(V ′).
Lemma 9. BRevb(V ′) ≤ BRevb(V ) and SRevb(V ′) ≤ 2SRevb(V ).
We defer the proofs of these lemmas to Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, and first
use them to prove Theorem 1.
Proof (of Theorem 1). If BRevb(V ′) ≥ b10 , then the theorem holds because the
optimal revenue Revb(V ) is at most the budget b. By Lemma 9, BRevb(V ) ≥
BRevb(V ′) ≥ b10 ≥
Revb(V )
10 .
We now assume BRevb(V ′) < b10 . The theorem follows straightforwardly
from Lemmas 7, 8, 9, and a black-box use of the main result of [4].
Revb(V ) ≤ Rev(V ′) +BRevb(V ) (Lemma 7)
≤ 4SRev(V ′) + 2BRev(V ′) + 2BRevb(V ) ([4])
≤ 4SRevb(V ′) + 22BRevb(V ′) + 2BRevb(V ). (Lemma 8)
≤ 8SRevb(V ) + 24BRevb(V ). (Lemma 9) ⊓⊔
3.1 Proof of Lemma 7
We will prove the following lemma, which is a generalization of Lemma 7.
Lemma 10. Fix b > 0 and 0 < c ≤ b. For any distribution V̂ with supp(V̂ ) ⊆
supp(V ) and Pr
V̂
[t] ≥ PrV [t] for any ‖t‖1 ≤ c, we have Rev
b(V ) ≤ (b/c) ·
BRevb(V ) +Rev(V̂ ).
Lemma 7 follows immediately from Lemma 10 by choosing c = b and V̂ = V ′,
because capping each coordinate at c does not create new support, and does not
decrease probability mass on any type t whose sum is at most c.
Intuitively, Lemma 10 upper bounds the optimal revenue by splitting the
buyer types t into two sets: when ‖t‖1 > c, we upper bound the seller’s revenue
by the budget b; when ‖t‖1 ≤ c, we run the optimal mechanism for Rev
b(V ).
9Proof (of Lemma 10). Let T and T̂ , f and f̂ denote the support and probability
density function of V and V̂ respectively. Let M∗ = (π∗, p∗) be the optimal
mechanism that obtains Revb(V ). Recall that π∗ and p∗ are the allocation and
payment rules, and (π∗, p∗) is the optimal solution to LP (1) for f and T .
We split the optimal revenue into two parts:
Revb(V ) =
∑
t∈T
f(t)p∗(t) =
∑
‖t‖
1
>c
f(t)p∗(t) +
∑
‖t‖
1
≤c
f(t)p∗(t).
Since p∗(t) ≤ b, the first term is at most b
∑
‖t‖
1
>c f(t) = b · Pr[‖v‖1 > c] ≤
(b/c)BRevb(V ), because we can sell the grand bundle at price p = c.
The second term is at most Rev(V̂ ), because M∗ is a feasible solution to the
LP for T̂ ⊆ T . In other words,M∗ satisfies the IC and IR constraints for V̂ . The
revenue of V̂ is at least the revenue of M∗ on V̂ :
Rev(V̂ ) ≥
∑
t∈T̂
f̂(t)p∗(t) ≥
∑
t∈T,‖t‖
1
≤c
f̂(t)p∗(t) ≥
∑
t∈T,‖t‖
1
≤c
f(t)p∗(t).
Combining the upper bounds, we get Revb(V ) ≤ (b/c)BRevb(V )+Rev(V̂ ).
3.2 Proof of Lemma 8
Lemma 8 states that when the sum of v′ ∼ V ′ is often small, the budget does
not matter too much for V ′. Intuitively, because each coordinate of v′ ∼ V ′ is
independent and upper bounded by b, a concentration inequality implies that
the sum has an exponentially decaying tail. Therefore, the budget constraint is
less critical because it is very unlikely that the buyer’s value for the grand bundle
is much larger than the budget.
We formalize this intuition by proving the following lemma, which is similar
to standard tail bounds. The main difference is that, instead of knowing the
mean of ‖v′‖1 is small, we only know that BRev
b(V ′) is small.
Lemma 11. If V ′ is independent and ‖v′‖∞ ≤ c for all v
′ ∼ V ′, then
Pr
v′∼V ′
[‖v′‖1 ≥ x+ y + c] ≤ Pr
v′∼V ′
[‖v′‖1 ≥ x] · Pr
v′∼V ′
[‖v′‖1 ≥ y] for all x, y > 0.
In particular, if Prv′∼V ′ [‖v
′‖1 ≥ c] ≤ q, then for all integer k ≥ 0,
Pr
v′∼V ′
[‖v′‖1 ≥ (2k + 1)c] ≤ q
k Pr
v′∼V ′
[‖v′‖1 ≥ c].
We defer the proof of Lemma 11 to Appendix A, and first use this tail bound to
prove Lemma 8.
Proof (of Lemma 8). Let c = b and q = 110 . We know that Pr[‖v
′‖1 ≥ c] ≤ q
from the assumption BRevb(V ′) ≤ b10 .
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First observe that BRevb(V ′) = maxp≤b (p · Pr[‖v
′‖1 ≥ p]) . If we price the
grand bundle at price p where (2k + 1)c < p ≤ (2k + 3)c for some k ≥ 0, by
Lemma 11, the revenue is at most
p · Pr[‖v′‖1 ≥ (2k + 1)c] ≤ (2k + 3)c · q
kPr[‖v′‖1 ≥ c] ≤ (2k + 3)q
kBRevb(V ′).
For SRev(V ′), similar to Lemma 7, we can upper bound the revenue by allowing
the seller to extract full revenue if ‖v′‖1 > c, and running the optimal budget-
constrained mechanism when ‖v′‖1 ≤ c:
SRev(V ′) ≤ SRevc(V ′) + E[‖v′‖1 | ‖v
′‖1 ≥ c]
≤ SRevc(V ′) +
∞∑
k=1
(2k + 3)c · Pr[‖v′‖1 ≥ (2k + 1)c]
≤ SRevc(V ′) +
∞∑
k=0
(2k + 3)qkBRevc(V ′)
≤ SRevc(V ′) + 4BRevc(V ′). ⊓⊔
3.3 Proof of Lemma 9
Lemma 9 states that SRevb(V ) and BRevb(V ) are both (up to constant factors)
monotone in V . We prove a more general version of the lemma that does not
require V to be independent. Recall that V̂  V means V̂ is coordinate-wise
stochastically dominated by V .
Lemma 12. Fix b > 0 and 0 < c ≤ b. For any distribution V̂  V , BRevc(V̂ ) ≤
BRevb(V ) and SRevc(V̂ ) ≤ max
(
1, 2c
b
)
SRevb(V ).
Lemma 9 follows directly from Lemma 12, by choosing c = b and V̂ = V ′.
Intuitively, we would like to prove that SRevb(V̂ ) ≤ SRevb(V ) for any
V̂  V . While this is true in the budget-free case (See Section 2.4), it is actually
false in the presence of a budget. We give a counterexample in Appendix B.
Fortunately, we can prove SRevb(V ′) ≤ 2SRevb(V ). The intuition is that we
can cap the price of each item at b/2, then the buyer either spend at least b/2,
or he will purchase everything he likes.
Proof (of Lemma 12). First consider BRev. Because c ≤ b and V̂  V ,
BRevc(V̂ ) = max
p≤c
(
p · Pr
v̂∼V̂
[‖v̂‖1 ≥ c]
)
≤ max
p≤b
(
p · Pr
v∼V
[‖v‖1 ≥ b]
)
= BRevb(V ).
For SRev, let M̂ be the optimal mechanism that achieves SRevc(V̂ ) by
pricing each item separately. We construct a mechanism M to mimic M̂ except
the prices are capped at b/2. Consider applying M to a buyer with valuation
drawn from V and a budget b. As V̂  V , we can couple the realizations v̂ ∼ V̂
and v ∼ V such that v̂ ≤ v (coordinate-wise). For every (v̂, v) pair:
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– If M gets a revenue of at least b2 on v. This is at least
b
2c -fraction of the
revenue M̂ gets on v̂, because the latter is at most c.
– If M gets a revenue less than b2 on v, then the buyer has enough budget left
to buy any item. Therefore, the buyer can buy everything he wants. Because
v̂ ≤ v, the revenue of M on v is at least that of M̂ on v̂.
Thus, M can get at least min(1, b2c )-fraction of the revenue that M̂ gets on v̂,
which implies SRev(V̂ ) ≤ max
(
1, 2c
b
)
SRevb(V ). ⊓⊔
4 Public Budget and Weakly Correlated Valuations
In this section, we present an alternative approach to prove our main result
(Theorem 1). Recall that the buyer has a public budget b and valuations drawn
from an independent distribution V .
Theorem 1. Revb(V ) ≤ 5SRevb(V ) + 6BRevb(V ).
Overview of Our Approach. We will truncate the input distribution V in
a different way: instead of truncating v ∼ V in ℓ∞-norm (as in Section 3), we
will truncate v in ℓ1-norm. This truncation produces a correlated distribution
V̂ . The upshot of truncating in ℓ1-norm is that we always have ‖v̂‖1 ≤ b, so V̂
can ignore the budget. In addition, as in Section 3, we can relate the optimal
revenue to the revenue of V̂ (Lemma 10), and we can relate the revenue of simple
mechanisms on V̂ back to revenue of simple mechanisms on V (Lemma 12).
We still need to argue that simple mechanisms work well for V̂ . This is the
main challenge in this approach. Because V̂ is correlated, we cannot apply the
result of [4] in a black-box way. Instead, we need to modify the analysis of pre-
vious work [41, 4, 16] and build on the key ideas like “core-tail” decomposition.
More specifically, we generalize the duality-based framework developed in [16]
to handle the specific type of correlation V̂ has.
Weakly Correlated Valuations. It is worth mentioning that our structural
lemmas (Lemmas 10 and 12) do not require the input distribution to be inde-
pendent. This is why our techniques can be applied to more general settings. For
example, in this section, we will generalize Theorem 1 with minimum effort to
handle weakly correlated valuations (see Definition 4 for the formal definition).
Corollary 2. Let V̂ be a weakly correlated distribution (Definition 4). We have
Revb(V̂ ) ≤ 5SRevb(V̂ ) + 6BRevb(V̂ ).
Our main contribution in this section is Lemma 13. Lemma 13 shows that for
any weakly correlated distribution V̂ (see Definition 4), the better of SRev(V̂ )
and BRev(V̂ ) is a constant approximation to the optimal revenue Rev(V̂ ).
Lemma 13. Fix c > 0. Let V̂ = V|(‖v‖
1
≤c) for an independent distribution V .
We have Rev(V̂ ) ≤ 5SRev(V̂ ) + 4BRev(V̂ ).
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We defer the proof of Lemma 13 to Appendix C. We first use these lemmas
to prove Theorem 1 and Corollary 2.
Proof (of Theorem 1 and Corollary 2). If minv∼V ‖v‖1 ≥ b/2, then the seller
can price the grand bundle at b/2 and the buyer always buys it. In this case,
the revenue is b/2 and Revb(V ) ≤ b ≤ 2BRevb(V ). Thus, we focus on the more
interesting case where Prv∼V [‖v‖1 ≤ b/2] > 0.
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Let V̂ := V|(‖v‖
1
≤c) for c = b/2. We will reuse Lemmas 10 and 12 from
Section 3. We can reuse both lemmas because they do not require V or V̂ to be
independent, V̂ does not modify the small-sum part of V , and V̂  V (which
we will prove as Lemma 21 in Appendix D).
Revb(V ) ≤ (b/c) ·BRevb(V ) +Rev(V̂ ) (Lemma 10)
≤ 2BRevb(V ) + 5SRev(V̂ ) + 4BRev(V̂ ) (Lemma 13)
= 2BRevb(V ) + 5SRevc(V̂ ) + 4BRevc(V̂ ) (‖v̂‖1 ≤ c)
≤ 2BRevb(V ) + 5SRevb(V ) + 4BRevb(V ). (Lemma 12)
We now prove Corollary 2. Intuitively, Corollary 2 holds because simple mech-
anisms work well for weakly correlated valuations, and the the weakly-correlated
notion is closed under further capping the sum.
Let V = V|(‖v‖
1
≤c2) be the input distribution. If c2 ≤ b, then we can remove
the budget constraint and apply Lemma 13 directly. If c2 > b, then we can cap
V at c1 = b/2 to obtain a weakly correlated distribution V̂ . One can verify that
Lemmas 10 and 12 still hold for V and V̂ , and Lemma 13 holds for V̂ . The only
difference is that we need to show V|(‖v‖
1
≤c1)  V|(‖v‖1≤c2) for c1 ≤ c2. We will
prove this (Lemma 20) in Appendix D. ⊓⊔
5 Private Budget
In this section, we consider the case where the budget b is no longer fixed but
instead drawn from a distribution B. One natural model is that the buyer’s
budget b is first drawn from B, and then depending on the value of b, the
buyer’s valuations are drawn independently for each item.
We show that in this case, the problem is at least as hard as finding (approxi-
mately) optimal mechanisms for correlated valuations in the budget-free setting.
Consider an instance in which all possible budgets are larger than maxv∼V ‖v‖1
so they are irrelevant. However, the budget can still be used as a signal (or a cor-
relation device) to produce correlated valuations. It is known that for correlated
distributions, the better of selling separately and bundling together [37], or even
the best partition-based mechanism [4], does not offer a constant approximation.
This negative result motivates us to study the private budget setting when
the budget distribution B is independent of the valuation distributions V .
9 Throughout the paper, when we consider the conditional distribution V̂ :=
V|(‖v‖1≤c), we will always have c > minv∈supp(V ) ‖v‖1, so that the event we con-
dition on happens with non-zero probability.
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5.1 Monotone-Hazard-Rate Budgets
We focus on the case where the budget is independent of valuations, and it
is drawn from a continuous10 monotone-hazard-rate (MHR) distribution. Let
g(·) and G(·) be the probability density function and cumulative distribution
function of B. The MHR condition says g(b)1−G(b) is non-decreasing in b.
Lemma 14. Let b∗ be the expectation of an MHR distribution B. Let M∗ be
the optimal mechanism for a buyer with a public budget b∗. Then in expectation,
M∗ extracts at least 12e -fraction of the expected optimal revenue when the buyer
has a private budget drawn from B.
Proof. Let R(b, V ) denote the expected revenue of M∗ when the buyer has a
public budget b and valuations drawn from V . Let R(B, V ) = Eb∼B[R(b, V )]
denote the expected revenue of M∗ when the buyer’s budget is drawn from B.
R(B, V ) =
∫
b
g(b)R(b, V )db ≥
∫
b≥b∗
g(b)R(b, V )db
=
∫
b≥b∗
g(b)R(b∗, V )db ≥ e−1 ·R(b∗, V ).
The second last step uses R(b, V ) = R(b∗, V ) when b ≥ b∗, because M∗ provides
a menu of allocation/payment pairs for the buyer to choose from; A buyer with
budget b ≥ b∗ can afford any option on the menu so he will choose the same
option as if he had budget b∗. The last inequality comes from the fact that for
any MHR distribution B, Prb∼B[b ≥ b
∗] ≥ e−1 (see, e.g., [5]).
Let RevB(V ) denote the optimal revenue we can extract when the buyer has
private budgets drawn from B.
RevB(V ) ≤
∫
b<b∗
g(b)Revb(V )db +
∫
b≥b∗
g(b)Revb(V )db
≤
∫
b<b∗
g(b)Revb
∗
(V )db+
∫
b≥b∗
g(b) ·
b
b∗
·Revb
∗
(V )db
≤ Revb
∗
(V ) +
∫
b
g(b)bdb
b∗
·Revb
∗
(V ) = 2Revb
∗
(V ).
The first line is because the seller can only do better if she knows the buyer’s
budget b. The third line is because b∗ = E[b]. The second line uses the fact that
Revb(V ) ≤ Revb
∗
(V ) when b < b∗ and Revb(V ) ≤ b
b∗
Revb
∗
(V ) when b > b∗.
We have Revb(V ) ≤ Revb
∗
(V ) when b < b∗ because a buyer with budget
b∗ can afford all options from the menu that achieves Revb(V ). When b > b∗,
consider the menu that achieves Revb(V ) and cap all prices at b∗. A buyer with
budget b > b∗ either chooses the same option as if he had budget b∗, or chooses a
different option whose price must be b∗, and therefore Revb(V ) ≤ b
b∗
Revb
∗
(V ).
By definition R(b∗, V ) = Revb
∗
(V ). Therefore, R(B, V ) ≥ 12eRev
B(V ). ⊓⊔
10 If the distribution is a discrete MHR distribution, similar results still hold. For
discrete distributions we have Prb∼B [b ≥ ⌊b
∗⌋] ≥ e−1 instead of Prb∼B [b ≥ b
∗] ≥ e−1.
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Theorem 3. When the budget distribution B is MHR, the better of pricing
items separately and bundling them together achieves a constant fraction of the
optimal revenue.
Proof. By pretending the budget is b∗,
SRevB(V ) ≥
∫
b≥b∗
g(b)SRevb
∗
(V )db ≥
1
e
SRevb
∗
(V ).
Similarly, BRevB(V ) ≥ 1
e
BRevb
∗
(V ). Therefore, by Theorem 1 and Lemma 14,
SRevB(V ) + BRevB(V ) = Ω(SRevb
∗
(V ) + BRevb
∗
(V )) = Ω(Revb
∗
(V )) =
Ω(RevB(V )). ⊓⊔
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper, we investigated the effectiveness of simple mechanisms in the
presence of budgets, and showed that for an additive buyer with independent
valuations and a public budget, either selling separately or selling the grand
bundle gives a constant approximation to optimal revenue.
The area of designing simple and approximately optimal auctions with budget
constraints is still largely unexplored. Our work leaves many natural follow-up
questions. We only considered selling to a single buyer. An immediate open ques-
tion is whether our results can be extended to multiple bidders. A generalization
to multiple bidders is known in the budget-free case [49, 16].
Question 1. Is there a simple mechanism that is approximately optimal for
multiple additive buyers, when each buyer has the same public budget b?
For private budgets where the budget is independent of the valuations, we
showed that if the budget distribution satisfies monotone hazard rate, then we
can extract a constant fraction of the revenue. The general case with arbitrary
budget distributions appears to be nontrivial and is an interesting avenue for
future work.
Question 2. Is there a simple mechanism that is approximately optimal for an
additive buyer with private budgets, when the budget distribution is independent
of the valuations?
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A Proof of the Concentration Lemma in Section 3.2
In this section, we prove Lemma 11. We first restate it for convenience.
Lemma 11. If V ′ is independent and ‖v′‖∞ ≤ c for all v
′ ∼ V ′, then
Pr
v′∼V ′
[‖v′‖1 ≥ x+ y + c] ≤ Pr
v′∼V ′
[‖v′‖1 ≥ x] · Pr
v′∼V ′
[‖v′‖1 ≥ y] for all x, y > 0.
In particular, if Prv′∼V ′ [‖v
′‖1 ≥ c] ≤ q, then for all integer k ≥ 0,
Pr
v′∼V ′
[‖v′‖1 ≥ (2k + 1)c] ≤ q
k Pr
v′∼V ′
[‖v′‖1 ≥ c].
Proof. Consider the probability of ‖v′‖1 ≥ x + y + c conditioned on ‖v
′‖1 ≥ x.
We will show this probability is at most the probability of ‖v′‖1 ≥ y.
For every v′ with ‖v′‖1 ≥ x, there is a unique j ∈ [m] where
∑j−1
i=1 v
′
i < x but∑j
i=1 v
′
i ≥ x. Now v
′
j is at most c, so for the total sum to be at least x+ y + c,
the remaining sum
∑m
i=j+1 v
′
i must be at least y. Due to the independence of V
′,
this probability is the same conditioned on any values of (v′1, . . . , v
′
j). Formally,
Pr[‖v′‖1 ≥ x+ y + c] =
m∑
j=1
Pr
[
‖v′‖1 ≥ x+ y + c ∧
j−1∑
i=1
v′i < x ∧
j∑
i=1
v′i ≥ x
]
≤
m∑
j=1
Pr
 m∑
i=j+1
v′i ≥ y ∧
j−1∑
i=1
v′i < x ∧
j∑
i=1
v′i ≥ x

=
m∑
j=1
Pr
 m∑
i=j+1
v′i ≥ y
 · Pr[j−1∑
i=1
v′i < x ∧
j∑
i=1
v′i ≥ x
]
= Pr[‖v′‖1 ≥ y] · Pr[‖v
′‖1 ≥ x].
The second statement can be proved inductively using the first statement.
The inductive step chooses x = c and y = (2k − 1)c. ⊓⊔
B Revenue Non-monotonicity for Separate Selling to a
Budgeted Buyer
We provide an example where V1  V2 but SRev
b(V1) > SRev
b(V2). Intuitively,
a budget-constrained buyer solves a Knapsack problem when deciding which
items to purchase, and the total volume (i.e, payment) of the optimal Knapsack
solution is not monotone in the item values. Increasing the value of a cheap item
might incentivize the buyer to purchase this item instead of a more expensive
one, if the buyer does not have enough budget to buy both items.
Consider an auction with 3 items. T1 and T2 are two matrices defined as
T1 =
2 0 00 1 1
2 1 0
 , T2 =
2 0 00 1 1
2 2 0
 .
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The rows of T1 are the support of V1, and similarly, the rows of T2 are the support
of V2. Each row is associated with a probability of
1
3 . Assume the budget b = 2.
One of the optimal mechanisms that obtains SRevb(V1) = 2 is to price the
items at (2, 1, 1). A buyer of type 1 and 3 will buy the first item, and a buyer of
type 2 will buy the last two items. This is optimal because SRevb cannot exceed
the budget.
However, SRevb(V2) < 2. To prove it, we first notice SRev
b(V2) ≤ 2 because
b = 2. It means we must get a revenue of 2 from all buyer types to make
SRevb(V2) = 2. Thus, we must price the first item at 2, and each of the last two
items at 1 to satisfy this constraint for the first two types. Nevertheless, with this
pricing strategy, we only get revenue 1 for the last buyer type (2, 2, 0), because
he will only buy the second item. This shows SRevb(V2) < 2 = SRev
b(V1).
C Simple Mechanisms for Weakly Correlated Valuations
This section is devoted to proving Lemma 13. Lemma 13 states that simple
mechanisms (more specifically, the better of SRev(V̂ ) and BRev(V̂ )) are ap-
proximately optimal for any weakly correlated distribution V̂ = V|(‖v‖
1
≤c). Note
that there is no budget in this section, only a cap c on the ℓ1-norm of v̂ ∼ V̂ .
Our approach builds on the ideas like “core-tail decomposition” from previous
works that showRev(V ) = O(SRev(V )+BRev(V )) for independent valuations
V [39, 41, 4, 16]. More specifically, we generalize the duality-based framework
developed in [16] to handle weakly correlated distributions. The idea of [16] is to
Lagrangify only the incentive constraints, then guess the Lagrangian multipliers
to derive an upper bound on the maximum revenue.
We first highlight some of the difficulties in extending previous works to
correlated distributions.
1. When the distribution is independent, one can upper bound the maximum
revenue by Myerson’s virtual value of the bidder’s favorite item, plus the
sum of the values of the remaining items. For correlated distributions, the
virtual value of the favorite item depends on the other items.
2. In the core part of core-tail decomposition, we need the total value of the low-
value items to concentrate around its expectation, so we can upper bound
their values by BRev (by selling the grand bundle at a price slightly lower
than that expectation). When the valuations are independent, we can show
the variance is small, which may not be true for correlated distributions.
These difficulties are not surprising, because Lemma 13 cannot hold for arbi-
trary correlated distributions. As shown in [11, 38], for correlated distributions,
the gap between the best deterministic and randomized mechanisms can be un-
bounded. Hence, we have to take advantage of the special properties of V̂ .
Notations. In this Section, because V̂ = V|(‖v‖
1
≤c) is the distribution we focus
on, we use T to denote the support of V̂ . Given a (correlated) distribution D,
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we use Dj to denote D’s marginal distribution on the j-th coordinate, and D−j
to denote D’s marginal (joint) distribution on coordinates other than j. Let Tj
and T−j be the support of V̂j and V̂−j respectively. In addition, we will make
use of the conditional distributions V̂j|v̂−j=t−j and V̂−j|v̂j=tj ; The former is the
distribution of v̂j for v̂ ∼ V̂ conditioned on v̂−j = t−j , and the latter is the
distribution of v̂−j conditioned on vj = tj . Abusing notation, we use f(t), f(tj),
f(t−j), f(tj |t−j), and f(t−j|tj) to denote the probability mass function of the
correlated and conditional distributions we mentioned in this section. When the
value of item j is drawn from f(tj |t−j), we use ϕ˜(tj |t−j) to denote item j’s
(ironed) Myerson’s virtual value.
For a bidder type t ∈ T ⊆ Rm, the favorite item of t is the one with the
highest value (with ties broken lexicographically). We write t ∈ Rj if and only
if j is the favorite item of type t after tie-breaking. Formally,
Rj = {t ∈ T | j is the smallest index with tj ≥ tk for all k ∈ [m]}.
Proof of Lemma 13. We extend the duality framework in [16] to handle
correlated distributions. As we will see in Section C.2, we can upper bound the
optimal revenue of V̂ into three components. Recall that π is the allocation rule.
For notational convenience, we write r for SRev(V̂ ). Notice that in Single we
get ϕ˜(tj |t−j) rather than ϕ˜(tj).
Rev(V̂ ) ≤
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
πj(t)ϕ˜(tj |t−j) · 1[t ∈ Rj ] (Single)
+
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
πj(t)tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] · 1[tj ≤ 2r] (Core)
+
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
πj(t)tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] · 1[tj > 2r]. (Tail)
Lemma 13 follows directly from the statements of Lemmas 15, 16, and 17.
Lemma 15. Single ≤ 2BRev(V̂ ) + SRev(V̂ ).
Lemma 16. Tail ≤ SRev(V̂ ).
Lemma 17. Core ≤ 2BRev(V̂ ) + 3SRev(V̂ ).
Organization. For completeness, we first recall the approach in [16] in Sec-
tion C.1. In Section C.2, we show that there exists a choice of the Lagrangian
multipliers that Rev(V̂ ) can be upper bounded by Single + Core + Tail.
Lemmas 15, 16, and 17 are proved in Section C.3.
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C.1 The Duality Based Approach in [16].
The optimal mechanism M∗ = (π∗, p∗) for V̂ is the optimal solution to the
following LP:
maximize
∑
t∈T f(t)p(t)
subject to π(t′)⊤t− p(t′) ≤ π(t)⊤t− p(t), ∀t ∈ T, t′ ∈ T+.
0 ≤ πj(t) ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ T, j ∈ [m].
π(∅) = 0, p(∅) = 0.
(2)
We can upper bound the optimal primal value by Lagrangifying the incentive
constraints.
Rev(V̂ ) = min
λ≥0
max
π,p
L(λ, π, p),
where the Lagrangian dual of LP (2) is given by
L(λ, π, p) =
∑
t∈T
f(t)p(t) +
∑
t∈T,t′∈T+
λ(t, t′)
[
(π(t)− π(t′))⊤t− (p(t)− p(t′))
]
=
∑
t∈T
p(t)
[
f(t)−
∑
t′∈T+
λ(t, t′) +
∑
t′∈T
λ(t′, t)
]
+
∑
t∈T
π(t)⊤
[ ∑
t′∈T+
λ(t, t′)t−
∑
t′∈T
λ(t′, t)t′
]
.
Because the p(t)’s are unconstrained variables, any dual solution with a finite
value must have
f(t)−
∑
t′∈T+
λ(t, t′) +
∑
t′∈T
λ(t′, t) = 0, ∀t ∈ T. (3)
From now on, we restrict our attention to only dual solution with finite val-
ues. We can then simplify L(λ, π, p) by replacing
∑
t′∈T+ λ(t, t
′) with f(t) +∑
t′∈T λ(t
′, t) to get rid of T+:
L(λ, π, p) =
∑
t∈T
π(t)⊤
[
f(t)t+
∑
t′∈T
λ(t′, t)t−
∑
t′∈T
λ(t′, t)t′
]
=
∑
t∈T
f(t)π(t)⊤
[
t−
1
f(t)
∑
t′∈T
λ(t′, t)(t′ − t)
]
.
We write Φ(t) as a shorthand for the term in the bracket: Φ(t) = t −
1
f(t)
∑
t′∈T λ(t
′, t)(t′ − t). We know that L(λ, π, p) =
∑
t∈T f(t)π(t)
⊤Φ(t) ≥
Rev(V̂ ) is an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal mechanism. We can
rewrite Equation (3) as
f(t) +
∑
t′∈T
λ(t′, t) =
∑
t′∈T+
λ(t, t′) =
∑
t′∈T
λ(t, t′) + λ(t,∅), ∀t ∈ T.
22
[16] interpreted these constraints as flow conservation constraints. Let λ(t, t′) ≥ 0
denote the amount of flow t sends to t′. The left-hand side is the total flow
received by t, where every type t receives f(t) units of flow from the source; and
the right-hand side is the total flow send out from t, with all the excess flow sent
to the sink (∅).
They proposed a “canonical flow” which was shown to be a good guess for
the Lagrangian multipliers. It turns out the same dual solution is sufficient to
prove our results for correlated distributions. In the next section, we recall this
canonical flow and use it to derive an upper bound on the optimal revenue.
C.2 Canonical Flow for Weakly Correlated Distributions
Recall that t ∈ Rj if and only if j is the favorite item of type t. Formally, there
exists λ(t, t′) ≥ 0 such that
– For every j, all flows entering Rj are from the source, and all flows leaving
Rj are to ∅.
– For t, t′ ∈ Rj , we can have λ(t
′, t) > 0 only if t and t′ only differ on the j-th
coordinate. When there is no ironing, λ(t′, t) > 0 only if t′j is the smallest
value larger than tj in Tj.
Lemma 18. There exists a set of the Lagrangian multipliers λ that satisfies the
flow conservation constraints, such that
(1) If t /∈ Rj, then Φj(t) = tj.
(2) If t ∈ Rj, then Φj(t) ≤ ϕ˜j(tj |t−j), where ϕ˜(tj |t−j) is item j’s (ironed)
Myerson’s virtual value conditioned on t−j.
Proof. Recall that Φ(t) = t − 1
f(t)
∑
t′∈T λ(t
′, t)(t′ − t). For (1), assume that
t ∈ Rk for some k 6= j. If λ(t
′, t) > 0, it must be the case that t and t′ are only
different on the k-th coordinate, so (t− t′)j = 0 and Φj(t) = tj .
Now we prove (2). We first consider a canonical flow without ironing. Fix
any j and t ∈ Rj . If tj is the largest value in Tj , then λ(t
′, t) = 0 for all t′ and
Φj(t) = tj . If tj is not the largest value in Tj , t receives flow from the source and
exactly one other node t′ where t′−j = t−j, and t
′
j is the smallest value larger
than tj in Tj . The total flow from t
′ to t includes the flows from the source to
all t∗ with t∗−j = t−j and t
∗
j > tj :
λ(t′, t) =
∑
t∗∈T
f(t∗) · 1
[
t∗−j = t−j ∧ t
∗
j > tj
]
= f(t−j)
∑
t∗
j
∈Tj ,t∗j>tj
f(t∗j |t−j) = f(t−j) (1− F (tj |t−j)) .
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Substituting λ(t′, t) in the expression of Φ(t), this implies
Φj(t) = tj −
1
f(t)
∑
t∗∈T
λ(t∗, t)(t∗j − tj)
= tj −
1
f(t)
λ(t′, t)(t′j − tj)
= tj −
f(t−j) (1− F (tj |t−j))
f(t−j)f(tj |t−j)
(t′j − tj) = ϕ(tj |t−j).
Finally, we show that the flow can be modified to implement Myerson’s iron-
ing procedure. The analysis on modifying the flow to reflect ironing is given
in [16], and we include it here for completeness. Suppose there exist two types
t, t′ ∈ Rj such that tj < t
′
j but Φj(t) > Φj(t
′). We can add a cycle of w units of
flow between t and t′, that is, we increase both λ(t, t′) and λ(t′, t) by w. Notice
that the resulting flow is still valid, and Φ(t∗) for all t∗ 6= t, t′ remain unchanged.
Moreover, the change does not alter Φk(t) or Φk(t
′) for all k 6= j. The only
effect of the change is to increase Φj(t) by w(t
′
j − tj)/f(t), and decrease Φj(t
′)
by w(t′j − tj)/f(t
′). Therefore, we can choose w so that Φj(t) = Φj(t
′) without
changing any other virtual values.
Repeating this process allows us to simulate Myerson’s ironing procedure.
One technical issue is that we may cut off an ironing interval of f(tj |t−j) because
it leaves the region Rj . However, we know that truncating an ironing interval I
to I ′ ⊆ I from below can only decrease the virtual value on I ′. This is because
the average virtual value on I ′ is smaller than the average virtual value on I,
otherwise we would not iron the entire interval I in the first place. ⊓⊔
C.3 Upper Bounds for Single, Core, and Tail
We decompose the upper bound we had in the previous section into three com-
ponents. Recall that r = SRev(V̂ ). By Lemma 18, we know that
Rev(V̂ ) ≤
∑
t∈T
f(t)π(t)⊤Φ(t)
=
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
πj(t) (ϕ˜(tj |t−j) · 1[t ∈ Rj ] + tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ])
≤
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
πj(t)ϕ˜(tj |t−j) · 1[t ∈ Rj ] (Single)
+
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
πj(t)tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] · 1[tj ≤ 2r] (Core)
+
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
πj(t)tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] · 1[tj > 2r]. (Tail)
We now restate the lemmas that upper bounds each component.
Lemma 15. Single ≤ 2BRev(V̂ ) + SRev(V̂ ).
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Proof. We first recall the expression of Single.
Single =
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
πj(t)ϕ˜(tj |t−j) · 1[t ∈ Rj ].
Because πj(t) · 1[t ∈ Rj ] is between 0 and 1, we can upper bound Single by
setting it to 1 whenever the ironed virtual value is positive, and 0 otherwise.
Single ≤
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
ϕ˜(tj |t−j) · 1[ϕ˜(tj |t−j) ≥ 0]
=
∑
j∈[m]
∑
t∈T
f(t−j)f(tj |t−j)ϕ˜(tj |t−j) · 1[ϕ˜(tj |t−j) ≥ 0]
=
∑
j∈[m]
∑
t−j∈T−j
f(t−j) ·Rev(tj |t−j).
Intuitively, we need to show that knowing t−j does not help us sell item j by
too much. Observe that V̂ is a correlated distribution obtained from capping an
independent distribution. The proof of the lemma crucially relies on the following
property of V̂ : revealing t−j gives the same amount of information as revealing
only the sum of t−j . For a fixed j, the revenue Rev(tj |t−j) can be captured by
the (non-disjoint) union of the following two cases:
(1) ‖t−j‖1 < c/2 and tj < c/2 both hold. Conditioned on this event, the val-
uation of tj is independent of t−j. Hence, knowing t−j does not provide
additional information.
(2) ‖t‖1 ≥ c/2. In this case, buyer’s value for the grand bundle is at least c/2,
so we could charge this to BRev(V̂ ).
It is worth noting that tj and t−j are not independent when ‖t‖1 < c/2, so we
have to condition on stricter events for them to become independent. Formally,
if ‖t−j‖1 < c/2,
f(tj |t−j , tj < c/2) = f(tj |tj < c/2), ∀j ∈ [m], t ∈ T.
We are now ready to bound Single. For single-parameter distributions, the
optimal auction simply sets a reserve price. Let p∗j be the optimal reserve price
for the distribution f(tj |tj < c/2), and let pj(t−j) be the optimal reserve price
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for the distribution f(tj |t−j).
Single ≤
∑
j∈[m]
∑
t−j∈T−j
f(t−j) ·Rev(tj |t−j)
=
∑
j∈[m]
∑
t∈T
f(t−j)f(tj |t−j)pj(t−j) · 1[tj ≥ pj(t−j)]
≤
∑
j
∑
‖t‖
1
≥ c
2
f(t)tj +
∑
j
∑
tj<
c
2
,‖t−j‖1<
c
2
f(t)pj(t−j) · 1[tj ≥ pj(t−j)]
≤
∑
‖t‖
1
≥ c
2
f(t)
∑
j
tj +
∑
j
∑
tj<
c
2
,‖t−j‖1<
c
2
f(t)p∗j · 1
[
tj ≥ p
∗
j
]
≤ c · Pr
t∼V̂
[
‖t‖1 ≥
c
2
]
+
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
p∗j · 1
[
tj ≥ p
∗
j
]
≤ 2BRev(V̂ ) + SRev(V̂ ).
The last step uses the facts that (1) we can price the grand bundle at price
c/2 and therefore BRev(V̂ ) ≥ (c/2) · Pr[‖t‖1 ≥ c/2]; and (2) the second term
is exactly the revenue we can obtain if we post each item j separately at price
p∗j . ⊓⊔
Recall that r = SRev(V̂ ). We continue to upper bound Tail and Core.
Lemma 16. Tail ≤ SRev(V̂ ).
Proof. Recall that Rj ⊆ T is the subset of buyer types whose favorite item is j.
Tail =
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
πj(t)tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] · 1[tj > 2r]
≤
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] · 1[tj > 2r]
=
∑
j∈[m]
∑
tj>2r
f(tj)
∑
t−j∈T−j
f(t−j |tj)tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ].
We first show that for any fixed t∗j > 2r, knowing the value for item j to be t
∗
j
will not increase the probability of t /∈ Rj by more than a factor of 2. Intuitively,
it is because tj > 2r is large enough. This is another place where we use the
special property of the V̂ we designed.
Recall that V̂j is the marginal distribution of V̂ on the j-th coordinate, and
f(tj) is the probability mass function of V̂j . The definition r = SRev(V̂ ) im-
plies that Pr
tj∼V̂j
[tj < 2r] ≥ 1/2, otherwise selling only item j at price 2r gives
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revenue more than r.∑
t−j∈T−j
f(t−j |t
∗
j ) · 1
[
(t∗j , t−j) /∈ Rj
]
≤ 2 Pr
tj∼V̂j
[tj < 2r] ·
∑
t−j∈T−j
f(t−j |t
∗
j ) · 1
[
(t∗j , t−j) /∈ Rj
]
= 2
∑
tj<2r
f(tj)
∑
t−j∈T−j
f(t−j|t
∗
j ) · 1
[
(t∗j , t−j) /∈ Rj
]
≤ 2
∑
tj<2r
f(tj)
∑
t−j∈T−j
f(t−j|tj) · 1[(tj , t−j) /∈ Rj ]
≤ 2
∑
t−j∈T−j
f(t−j) · 1[t /∈ Rj ].
The last step uses the fact that f(t−j) =
∑
tj
f(tj)f(t−j |tj). The second last
step states the event t /∈ Rj (that j is not the largest coordinate) is more likely
to happen when the value of tj is smaller. It uses the monotonicity of f(t−j | · )
and tj < 2r < t
∗
j . This fact is captured in Lemma 20 and will be proved in
Appendix D.
Lemma 20. Let V̂ = V|(‖v‖
1
≤c1) and V˜ = V|(‖v‖1≤c2) for any c1 ≤ c2. We have
V̂  V˜ .
Finally, we relate our upper bound on Tail to r.
Tail ≤
∑
j∈[m]
∑
tj>2r
f(tj)
∑
t−j∈T−j
f(t−j |tj)tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ]
≤ 2
∑
j∈[m]
∑
tj>2r
f(tj)
∑
t−j∈T−j
f(t−j)tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ]
≤ 2
∑
j∈[m]
∑
tj>2r
f(tj) · r ≤ SRev(V̂ ).
The second last step is because for any j, selling each item separately at the
same price t∗j gives revenue at least
∑
t−j
f(t−j)t
∗
j ·1[t /∈ Rj ]: If some item k 6= j
satisfies that tk ≥ t
∗
j , then the buyer would purchase at least one of such items.
The last step holds because
∑
j∈[m]
∑
tj≥2r
f(tj) · 2r is exactly the revenue of
selling each item at 2r, so it is at most SRev(V̂ ). ⊓⊔
Lemma 17. Core ≤ 2BRev(V̂ ) + 3SRev(V̂ ).
Proof. Recall r = SRev(V̂ ). If we sell the grand bundle at price Core− 3r, we
show that the buyer will purchase it with probability at least 5/9. This implies
that BRev(V̂ ) ≥ 59 (Core − 3r), or equivalently Core ≤
9
5BRev(V̂ ) + 3r ≤
2BRev(V̂ ) + 3SRev(V̂ ).
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For the simplicity of presentation, we define a new random variable s ∈ Rm
as follows: we first draw a sample v̂ from V̂ , and set sj = min(v̂j , 2r) for all
j ∈ [m].
Core =
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
πj(t)tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] · 1[tj ≤ 2r]
≤
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
tj · 1[tj ≤ 2r]
≤
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
j∈[m]
(tj · 1[tj ≤ 2r] + 2r · 1[tj > 2r]) = E[‖s‖1].
Since we price the grand bundle at Core − 3r ≤ E[‖s‖1]− 3r, and the buyer’s
value for the grand bundle is ‖t‖1, it is sufficient to prove
Pr
t∼V̂
[‖t‖1 ≥ E[‖s‖1]− 3r] ≥
5
9
.
Moreover, because V̂ stochastically dominates s, it is sufficient to prove
Pr[‖s‖1 ≥ E[‖s‖1]− 3r] ≥
5
9
.
Intuitively, the condition says that the ℓ1-norm of the random variable s con-
centrates around its expectation. This is the crucial reason why we design our
V̂ to be negatively correlated.
In the next claim (Lemma 19), we are going to prove Var[‖s‖1] ≤ 4r
2. Assume
this is true, we conclude the proof by applying the Chebyshev inequality,
Pr[‖s‖1 < E[‖s‖1]− 3r] ≤
Var ‖s‖1
9r2
≤
4
9
. ⊓⊔
Lemma 19. Let c ∈ Rm be the random variable with sj = min(v̂j , 2r) for all j
and v̂ ∼ V̂ . We have Var[‖s‖1] ≤ 4r
2.
Proof. We first show that for any i 6= j, si and sj are negatively correlated, i.e.,
Cov(si, sj) = E[sisj ]− E[si] · E[sj ] ≤ 0.
Observe that V̂j|v̂i=x stochastically dominates V̂j|v̂i=y for any two possible
values x < y of v̂i. This is because, for any a ∈ R,
Pr
v̂∼V̂
[v̂j ≤ a | v̂i = x]
= Pr
v∼V
[vj ≤ a | vi = x, ‖v‖1 ≤ c ]
= Pr
vj∼Vj
vj ≤ a
∣∣∣∣∣∣ vj ≤ c− x−
∑
k 6=i,j
vk

≤ Pr
vj∼Vj
vj ≤ a
∣∣∣∣∣∣ vj ≤ c− y −
∑
k 6=i,j
vk
 = Pr
v̂∼V̂
[v̂j ≤ a | v̂i = y ].
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Because sj = min(v̂j , 2r), we know that sj|vi=x  sj|vi=y as well. It follows that
E[sj |vi = x] ≥ E[sj |vi = y]. In addition, since E[sj |si = x] = E[sj |vi = x] when
x < 2r, and E[sj |si = 2r] = E[sj |vi ≥ 2r], we can deduce that E[sj |si] weakly
decreases as si increases. Therefore, we get
E[sisj ] =
∑
si
Pr[si] (si · E[sj |si]) ≤
∑
si
Pr[si] (si · E[sj ]) = E[si] · E[sj ],
by an application of (a generalization of) the rearrangement inequality.
Given the negative correlations between the si’s, we can upper bound the
variance of their sum.
Var
∑
i∈[m]
si
 = ∑
i∈[m]
Var(si) + 2
∑
1≤i<j≤m
Cov(si, sj) ≤
∑
i∈[m]
Var(si).
It remains to show
∑
iVar(si) ≤ 4r
2. This part is identical to the analysis
in earlier works [41, 4, 16], but we include it for completeness. Let rj ∈ R
denote the maximum revenue one can extract by selling item j alone. Note that
SRev(V̂ ) = r =
∑
j rj , so it is sufficient to show Var(sj) ≤ 4rrj for all j.
Fix some j ∈ [m]. We use x = sj as an alias for the random variable sj . We
know that
(1) x is at most 2r, and
(2) the revenue of x is at most rj : (a · Pr[x ≥ a]) ≤ rj for any a ∈ R.
Combining these two facts gives the required bound on the variance of x. Let
0 < a1 < . . . < aℓ ≤ 2r be the support of x, and let a0 = 0.
E[x2] =
ℓ∑
k=1
Pr[x = ak] · a
2
k
=
ℓ∑
k=1
(a2k − a
2
k−1) · Pr[x ≥ ak]
<
ℓ∑
k=1
2(ak − ak−1)
(
ak · Pr[x ≥ ak]
)
≤ rj
ℓ∑
k=1
2(ak − ak−1)
= 2rjaℓ ≤ 4rrj . ⊓⊔
D Proof of Lemma 21 and 20
In this section we prove Lemma 21 and 20.
Lemma 20. V|(‖v‖
1
≤c1)  V|(‖v‖1≤c2) for any c1 ≤ c2.
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Proof. We are going to modify any v˜ dimension by dimension to reach v̂. Define
n random functions σ1, σ2, . . . , σn, where σi(u) and u only differs in ui. In other
words, σi only modifies the i-th dimension of its input. Also define τi = σi ◦
σi−1 ◦ · · · ◦ σ1. Note that τn(v) ≤ v as long as σi(τi−1(v)) ≤ τi−1(v) for all i.
In the first step, select a σ1 such that
Pr
v∼V˜
[(σ1(v))1] = Pr
v∼V˜
[
v1
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
vi ≤ c1
]
.
Then we separately deal with v2’s according to their (τ1(v))1 value. Select a σ2
such that
Pr
v∼V˜
[(σ2(v))2 | (τ1(v))1] = Pr
v∼V˜
[
v2
∣∣∣∣∣(τ1(v))1, (τ1(v))1 +
n∑
i=2
vi ≤ c1
]
.
We continue this procedure till we get σn. The k-th step will be setting
Pr
v∼V˜
[(σk(v))k|(τ1(v))1, . . . , (τk−1(v))k−1]
= Pr
v∼V˜
[
vk
∣∣∣∣∣(τ1(v))1, . . . , (τk−1(v))k−1,
k−1∑
i=1
(τi(v))i +
n∑
i=k
vi ≤ c1
]
.
Next we show for all k, there exists σk satisfying (σk(x))k ≤ xk for all x. This
is simply first-order stochastic dominance for one-dimensional distributions, and
it is equivalent to the following condition:
Pr
v∼V˜
[vk ≤ a | (τ1(v))1, . . . , (τk−1(v))k−1]
≤ Pr
v∼V˜
[
vk ≤ a
∣∣∣∣∣(τ1(v))1, . . . , (τk−1(v))k−1,
k−1∑
i=1
(τi(v))i +
n∑
i=k
vi ≤ c1
]
, ∀a ∈ R.
Writing pk = (vk+1, . . . , vn), qk = ((τ1(v))1, . . . , (τk−1(v))k−1), and rk =
(v1, . . . , vk−1), the inequality above is true because
Pr
v∼V˜
[vk ≤ a | qk, vk + ‖pk‖1 + ‖qk‖1 ≤ c1]
=
∑
pk,rk
Pr
v∼V
[pk, rk] · Pr
v∼V
[vk ≤ a | qk, pk, rk, vk ≤ min(c1 − ‖pk‖1 − ‖qk‖1,
c2 − ‖pk‖1 − ‖rk‖1)]
≥
∑
pk,rk
Pr
v∼V
[pk, rk] · Pr
v∼V
[vk ≤ a | qk, pk, rk, vk ≤ min(c2 − ‖pk‖1 − ‖qk‖1,
c2 − ‖pk‖1 − ‖rk‖1)]
= Pr
v∼V˜
[vk ≤ a | qk] .
Therefore τn is the random function that defines coordinate-wise stochastic
dominance, as every σi satisfies σi(x) ≤ x for all x.
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Lemma 21. V|(‖v‖
1
≤c)  V for any c > 0.
Proof. It is implied by Lemma 20 when c1 = c and c2 = maxv∈supp(V ) ‖v‖1.
